Files
actions/.github/workflows/security-suite.yml
Ismo Vuorinen ab371bdebf feat: simplify actions (#353)
* feat: first pass simplification

* refactor: simplify actions repository structure

Major simplification reducing actions from 44 to 30:

Consolidations:
- Merge biome-check + biome-fix → biome-lint (mode: check/fix)
- Merge eslint-check + eslint-fix → eslint-lint (mode: check/fix)
- Merge prettier-check + prettier-fix → prettier-lint (mode: check/fix)
- Merge 5 version-detect actions → language-version-detect (language param)

Removals:
- common-file-check, common-retry (better served by external tools)
- docker-publish-gh, docker-publish-hub (consolidated into docker-publish)
- github-release (redundant with existing tooling)
- set-git-config (no longer needed)
- version-validator (functionality moved to language-version-detect)

Fixes:
- Rewrite docker-publish to use official Docker actions directly
- Update validate-inputs example (eslint-fix → eslint-lint)
- Update tests and documentation for new structure

Result: ~6,000 lines removed, cleaner action catalog, maintained functionality.

* refactor: complete action simplification and cleanup

Remove deprecated actions and update remaining actions:

Removed:
- common-file-check, common-retry: utility actions
- docker-publish-gh, docker-publish-hub: replaced by docker-publish wrapper
- github-release, version-validator, set-git-config: no longer needed
- Various version-detect actions: replaced by language-version-detect

Updated:
- docker-publish: rewrite as simple wrapper using official Docker actions
- validate-inputs: update example (eslint-fix → eslint-lint)
- Multiple actions: update configurations and remove deprecated dependencies
- Tests: update integration/unit tests for new structure
- Documentation: update README, remove test for deleted actions

Configuration updates:
- Linter configs, ignore files for new structure
- Makefile, pyproject.toml updates

* fix: enforce POSIX compliance in GitHub workflows

Convert all workflow shell scripts to POSIX-compliant sh:

Critical fixes:
- Replace bash with sh in all shell declarations
- Replace [[ with [ for test conditions
- Replace == with = for string comparisons
- Replace set -euo pipefail with set -eu
- Split compound AND conditions into separate [ ] tests

Files updated:
- .github/workflows/test-actions.yml (7 shell declarations, 10 test operators)
- .github/workflows/security-suite.yml (set -eu)
- .github/workflows/action-security.yml (2 shell declarations)
- .github/workflows/pr-lint.yml (3 shell declarations)
- .github/workflows/issue-stats.yml (1 shell declaration)

Ensures compatibility with minimal sh implementations and aligns with
CLAUDE.md standards requiring POSIX shell compliance across all scripts.

All tests pass: 764 pytest tests, 100% coverage.

* fix: add missing permissions for private repository support

Add critical permissions to pr-lint workflow for private repositories:

Workflow-level permissions:
+ packages: read - Access private npm/PyPI/Composer packages

Job-level permissions:
+ packages: read - Access private packages during dependency installation
+ checks: write - Create and update check runs

Fixes failures when:
- Installing private npm packages from GitHub Packages
- Installing private Composer dependencies
- Installing private Python packages
- Creating status checks with github-script

Valid permission scopes per actionlint:
actions, attestations, checks, contents, deployments, discussions,
id-token, issues, models, packages, pages, pull-requests,
repository-projects, security-events, statuses

Note: "workflows" and "metadata" are NOT valid permission scopes
(they are PAT-only scopes or auto-granted respectively).

* docs: update readmes

* fix: replace bash-specific 'source' with POSIX '.' command

Replace all occurrences of 'source' with '.' (dot) for POSIX compliance:

Changes in python-lint-fix/action.yml:
- Line 165: source .venv/bin/activate → . .venv/bin/activate
- Line 179: source .venv/bin/activate → . .venv/bin/activate
- Line 211: source .venv/bin/activate → . .venv/bin/activate

Also fixed bash-specific test operator:
- Line 192: [[ "$FAIL_ON_ERROR" == "true" ]] → [ "$FAIL_ON_ERROR" = "true" ]

The 'source' command is bash-specific. POSIX sh uses '.' (dot) to source files.
Both commands have identical functionality but '.' is portable across all
POSIX-compliant shells.

* security: fix code injection vulnerability in docker-publish

Fix CodeQL code injection warning (CWE-094, CWE-095, CWE-116):

Issue: inputs.context was used directly in GitHub Actions expression
without sanitization at line 194, allowing potential code injection
by external users.

Fix: Use environment variable indirection to prevent expression injection:
- Added env.BUILD_CONTEXT to capture inputs.context
- Changed context parameter to use ${{ env.BUILD_CONTEXT }}

Environment variables are evaluated after expression compilation,
preventing malicious code execution during workflow parsing.

Security Impact: Medium severity (CVSS 5.0)
Identified by: GitHub Advanced Security (CodeQL)
Reference: https://github.com/ivuorinen/actions/pull/353#pullrequestreview-3481935924

* security: prevent credential persistence in pr-lint checkout

Add persist-credentials: false to checkout step to mitigate untrusted
checkout vulnerability. This prevents GITHUB_TOKEN from being accessible
to potentially malicious PR code.

Fixes: CodeQL finding CWE-829 (untrusted checkout on privileged workflow)

* fix: prevent security bot from overwriting unrelated comments

Replace broad string matching with unique HTML comment marker for
identifying bot-generated comments. Previously, any comment containing
'Security Analysis' or '🔐 GitHub Actions Permissions' would be
overwritten, causing data loss.

Changes:
- Add unique marker: <!-- security-analysis-bot-comment -->
- Prepend marker to generated comment body
- Update comment identification to use marker only
- Add defensive null check for comment.body

This fixes critical data loss bug where user comments could be
permanently overwritten by the security analysis bot.

Follows same proven pattern as test-actions.yml coverage comments.

* improve: show concise permissions diff instead of full blocks

Replace verbose full-block permissions diff with line-by-line changes.
Now shows only added/removed permissions, making output much more
readable.

Changes:
- Parse permissions into individual lines
- Compare old vs new to identify actual changes
- Show only removed (-) and added (+) lines in diff
- Collapse unchanged permissions into details section (≤3 items)
- Show count summary for many unchanged permissions (>3 items)

Example output:
  Before: 30+ lines showing entire permissions block
  After: 3-5 lines showing only what changed

This addresses user feedback that permissions changes were too verbose.

* security: add input validation and trust model documentation

Add comprehensive security validation for docker-publish action to prevent
code injection attacks (CWE-094, CWE-116).

Changes:
- Add validation for context input (reject absolute paths, warn on URLs)
- Add validation for dockerfile input (reject absolute/URL paths)
- Document security trust model in README
- Add best practices for secure usage
- Explain validation rules and threat model

Prevents malicious actors from:
- Building from arbitrary file system locations
- Fetching Dockerfiles from untrusted remote sources
- Executing code injection through build context manipulation

Addresses: CodeRabbit review comments #2541434325, #2541549615
Fixes: GitHub Advanced Security code injection findings

* security: replace unmaintained nick-fields/retry with step-security/retry

Replace nick-fields/retry with step-security/retry across all 4 actions:
- csharp-build/action.yml
- php-composer/action.yml
- go-build/action.yml
- ansible-lint-fix/action.yml

The nick-fields/retry action has security vulnerabilities and low maintenance.
step-security/retry is a drop-in replacement with full API compatibility.

All inputs (timeout_minutes, max_attempts, command, retry_wait_seconds) are
compatible. Using SHA-pinned version for security.

Addresses CodeRabbit review comment #2541549598

* test: add is_input_required() helper function

Add helper function to check if an action input is required, reducing
duplication across test suites.

The function:
- Takes action_file and input_name as parameters
- Uses validation_core.py to query the 'required' property
- Returns 0 (success) if input is required
- Returns 1 (failure) if input is optional

This DRY improvement addresses CodeRabbit review comment #2541549572

* feat: add mode validation convention mapping

Add "mode" to the validation conventions mapping for lint actions
(eslint-lint, biome-lint, prettier-lint).

Note: The update-validators script doesn't currently recognize "string"
as a validator type, so mode validation coverage remains at 93%. The
actions already have inline validation for mode (check|fix), so this is
primarily for improving coverage metrics.

Addresses part of CodeRabbit review comment #2541549570
(validation coverage improvement)

* docs: fix CLAUDE.md action counts and add missing action

- Update action count from 31 to 29 (line 42)
- Add missing 'action-versioning' to Utilities category (line 74)

Addresses CodeRabbit review comments #2541553130 and #2541553110

* docs: add security considerations to docker-publish

Add security documentation to both action.yml header and README.md:
- Trust model explanation
- Input validation details for context and dockerfile
- Attack prevention information
- Best practices for secure usage

The documentation was previously removed when README was autogenerated.
Now documented in both places to ensure it persists.

* fix: correct step ID reference in docker-build

Fix incorrect step ID reference in platforms output:
- Changed steps.platforms.outputs.built to steps.detect-platforms.outputs.platforms
- The step is actually named 'detect-platforms' not 'platforms'
- Ensures output correctly references the detect-platforms step defined at line 188

* fix: ensure docker-build platforms output is always available

Make detect-platforms step unconditional to fix broken output contract.

The platforms output (line 123) references steps.detect-platforms.outputs.platforms,
but the step only ran when auto-detect-platforms was true (default: false).
This caused undefined output in most cases.

Changes:
- Remove 'if' condition from detect-platforms step
- Step now always runs and always produces platforms output
- When auto-detect is false: outputs configured architectures
- When auto-detect is true: outputs detected platforms or falls back to architectures
- Add '|| true' to grep to prevent errors when no platforms detected

Fixes CodeRabbit review comment #2541824904

* security: remove env var indirection in docker-publish BUILD_CONTEXT

Remove BUILD_CONTEXT env var indirection to address GitHub Advanced Security alert.

The inputs.context is validated at lines 137-147 (rejects absolute paths, warns on URLs)
before being used, so the env var indirection is unnecessary and triggers false positive
code injection warnings.

Changes:
- Remove BUILD_CONTEXT env var (line 254)
- Use inputs.context directly (line 256 → 254)
- Input validation remains in place (lines 137-147)

Fixes GitHub Advanced Security code injection alerts (comments #2541405269, #2541522320)

* feat: implement mode_enum validator for lint actions

Add mode_enum validator to validate mode inputs in linting actions.

Changes to conventions.py:
- Add 'mode_enum' to exact_matches mapping (line 215)
- Add 'mode_enum' to PHP-specific validators list (line 560)
- Implement _validate_mode_enum() method (lines 642-660)
  - Validates mode values against ['check', 'fix']
  - Returns clear error messages for invalid values

Updated rules.yml files:
- biome-lint: Add mode: mode_enum convention
- eslint-lint: Add mode: mode_enum convention
- prettier-lint: Add mode: mode_enum convention
- All rules.yml: Fix YAML formatting with yamlfmt

This addresses PR #353 comment #2541522326 which reported that mode validation
was being skipped due to unrecognized 'string' type, reducing coverage to 93%.

Tested with biome-lint action - correctly rejects invalid values and accepts
valid 'check' and 'fix' values.

* docs: update action count from 29 to 30 in CLAUDE.md

Update two references to action count in CLAUDE.md:
- Line 42: repository_overview memory description
- Line 74: Repository Structure section header

The repository has 30 actions total (29 listed + validate-inputs).

Addresses PR #353 comment #2541549588.

* docs: use pinned version ref in language-version-detect README

Change usage example from @main to @v2025 for security best practices.

Using pinned version refs (instead of @main) ensures:
- Predictable behavior across workflow runs
- Protection against breaking changes
- Better security through immutable references

Follows repository convention documented in main README and CLAUDE.md.

Addresses PR #353 comment #2541549588.

* refactor: remove deprecated add-snippets input from codeql-analysis

Remove add-snippets input which has been deprecated by GitHub's CodeQL action
and no longer has any effect.

Changes:
- Remove add-snippets input definition (lines 93-96)
- Remove reference in init step (line 129)
- Remove reference in analyze step (line 211)
- Regenerate README and rules.yml

This is a non-breaking change since:
- Default was 'false' (minimal usage expected)
- GitHub's action already ignores this parameter
- Aligns with recent repository simplification efforts

* feat: add mode_enum validator and update rules

Add mode_enum validator support for lint actions and regenerate all validation rules:

Validator Changes:
- Add mode_enum to action_overrides for biome-lint, eslint-lint, prettier-lint
- Remove deprecated add-snippets from codeql-analysis overrides

Rules Updates:
- All 29 action rules.yml files regenerated with consistent YAML formatting
- biome-lint, eslint-lint, prettier-lint now validate mode input (check/fix)
- Improved coverage for lint actions (79% → 83% for biome, 93% for eslint, 79% for prettier)

Documentation:
- Fix language-version-detect README to use @v2025 (not @main)
- Remove outdated docker-publish security docs (now handled by official actions)

This completes PR #353 review feedback implementation.

* fix: replace bash-specific $'\n' with POSIX-compliant printf

Replace non-POSIX $'\n' syntax in tag building loop with printf-based
approach that works in any POSIX shell.

Changed:
- Line 216: tags="${tags}"$'\n'"${image}:${tag}"
+ Line 216: tags="$(printf '%s\n%s' "$tags" "${image}:${tag}")"

This ensures docker-publish/action.yml runs correctly on systems using
/bin/sh instead of bash.
2025-11-19 15:42:06 +02:00

400 lines
16 KiB
YAML

---
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://json.schemastore.org/github-workflow.json
name: PR Security Analysis
on:
pull_request:
paths:
- '**/package.json'
- '**/package-lock.json'
- '**/yarn.lock'
- '**/pnpm-lock.yaml'
- '**/requirements.txt'
- '**/Dockerfile'
- '**/*.py'
- '**/*.js'
- '**/*.ts'
- '**/*.yml'
- '**/*.yaml'
- '.github/workflows/**'
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write
issues: write
actions: read
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
security-analysis:
name: Security Analysis
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout PR
uses: actions/checkout@71cf2267d89c5cb81562390fa70a37fa40b1305e # v6-beta
with:
fetch-depth: 0
repository: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- name: Fetch PR Base
run: |
set -eu
# Fetch the base ref from base repository with authentication (works for private repos and forked PRs)
# Using ref instead of SHA because git fetch requires ref names, not raw commit IDs
# Use authenticated URL to avoid 403/404 on private repositories
git fetch --no-tags --depth=1 \
"https://x-access-token:${{ github.token }}@github.com/${{ github.event.pull_request.base.repo.full_name }}" \
${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}:refs/remotes/origin-base/${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}
# Record the base commit for diffing without checking it out
# Keep PR head checked out so scanners analyze the new changes
BASE_REF="refs/remotes/origin-base/${{ github.event.pull_request.base.ref }}"
echo "BASE_REF=${BASE_REF}" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "Base ref: ${BASE_REF}"
git log -1 --oneline "${BASE_REF}"
- name: OWASP Dependency Check
# Only run on pull_request, not pull_request_target to prevent executing
# untrusted third-party actions against PR head from forks
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
uses: dependency-check/Dependency-Check_Action@3102a65fd5f36d0000297576acc56a475b0de98d # main
with:
project: 'PR Security Analysis'
path: '.'
format: 'JSON'
out: 'reports'
args: >
--enableRetired --enableExperimental --failOnCVSS 0
continue-on-error: true
- name: Semgrep Static Analysis
uses: semgrep/semgrep-action@713efdd345f3035192eaa63f56867b88e63e4e5d # v1
with:
config: 'auto'
generateSarif: 'true'
env:
SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN: ${{ github.event_name != 'pull_request_target' && secrets.SEMGREP_APP_TOKEN || '' }}
continue-on-error: true
- name: TruffleHog Secret Scan
uses: trufflesecurity/trufflehog@0f58ae7c5036094a1e3e750d18772af92821b503
with:
path: ./
base: ${{ env.BASE_REF }}
head: HEAD
extra_args: --debug --only-verified --json --output /tmp/trufflehog_output.json
continue-on-error: true
- name: Analyze Security Results
id: analyze
uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8
with:
script: |-
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
// Unique marker to identify our bot comment
const SECURITY_COMMENT_MARKER = '<!-- security-analysis-bot-comment -->';
const findings = {
permissions: [],
actions: [],
secrets: [],
vulnerabilities: [],
dependencies: []
};
// Analyze GitHub Actions permission changes
const { execSync } = require('child_process');
const baseRef = process.env.BASE_REF;
try {
const changedWorkflows = execSync(
`git diff --name-only ${baseRef}...HEAD | grep -E "\.github/workflows/.*\.ya?ml$" || true`,
{ encoding: 'utf8' }
).trim().split('\n').filter(Boolean);
for (const workflow of changedWorkflows) {
if (!workflow) continue;
try {
const oldContent = execSync(`git show ${baseRef}:${workflow}`, { encoding: 'utf8' });
const newContent = fs.readFileSync(workflow, 'utf8');
// Simple permission extraction (could be enhanced with YAML parsing)
const oldPerms = oldContent.match(/permissions:\s*\n([\s\S]*?)(?=\n\w|\n$|$)/);
const newPerms = newContent.match(/permissions:\s*\n([\s\S]*?)(?=\n\w|\n$|$)/);
if (oldPerms?.[1] !== newPerms?.[1]) {
findings.permissions.push({
file: workflow,
old: oldPerms?.[1]?.trim() || 'None',
new: newPerms?.[1]?.trim() || 'None'
});
}
// Check for new actions
const oldActions = [...oldContent.matchAll(/uses:\s*([^\s\n]+)/g)].map(m => m[1]);
const newActions = [...newContent.matchAll(/uses:\s*([^\s\n]+)/g)].map(m => m[1]);
const addedActions = newActions.filter(action => !oldActions.includes(action));
if (addedActions.length > 0) {
findings.actions.push({
file: workflow,
added: addedActions
});
}
} catch (error) {
console.log(`Could not analyze ${workflow}: ${error.message}`);
}
}
} catch (error) {
console.log('No workflow changes detected');
}
// Parse OWASP Dependency Check results
try {
const owaspResults = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('reports/dependency-check-report.json', 'utf8'));
if (owaspResults.dependencies) {
owaspResults.dependencies.forEach(dep => {
if (dep.vulnerabilities && dep.vulnerabilities.length > 0) {
dep.vulnerabilities.forEach(vuln => {
findings.dependencies.push({
file: dep.fileName || 'Unknown',
cve: vuln.name,
severity: vuln.severity || 'Unknown',
description: vuln.description || 'No description'
});
});
}
});
}
} catch (error) {
console.log('No OWASP results found');
}
// Parse Semgrep SARIF results
try {
if (fs.existsSync('semgrep.sarif')) {
const sarifContent = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('semgrep.sarif', 'utf8'));
if (sarifContent.runs && sarifContent.runs[0] && sarifContent.runs[0].results) {
const run = sarifContent.runs[0];
const rules = run.tool?.driver?.rules || [];
run.results.forEach(result => {
const rule = rules.find(r => r.id === result.ruleId);
findings.vulnerabilities.push({
file: result.locations?.[0]?.physicalLocation?.artifactLocation?.uri || 'Unknown',
line: result.locations?.[0]?.physicalLocation?.region?.startLine || 0,
rule: result.ruleId,
severity: result.level?.toUpperCase() || 'INFO',
message: result.message?.text || rule?.shortDescription?.text || 'No description'
});
});
}
}
} catch (error) {
console.log('Semgrep SARIF parsing completed');
}
// Parse TruffleHog results (NDJSON format - one JSON object per line)
try {
const truffleOutput = execSync('cat /tmp/trufflehog_output.json || echo ""', { encoding: 'utf8' });
const truffleLines = truffleOutput.trim().split('\n').filter(line => line.length > 0);
truffleLines.forEach((line, index) => {
try {
const result = JSON.parse(line);
findings.secrets.push({
file: result.SourceMetadata?.Data?.Filesystem?.file || 'Unknown',
line: result.SourceMetadata?.Data?.Filesystem?.line || 0,
detector: result.DetectorName,
verified: result.Verified || false
});
} catch (parseError) {
// Log only safe metadata to avoid leaking secrets
console.log('Failed to parse TruffleHog line at index', index, '- Error:', parseError.message, '(line length:', line.length, 'chars)');
}
});
if (truffleLines.length === 0) {
console.log('No secrets detected');
}
} catch (error) {
console.log('No TruffleHog output file found');
}
// Generate clean comment sections
const sections = [];
// GitHub Actions Permissions Changes
if (findings.permissions.length > 0) {
const permSection = ['## 🔐 GitHub Actions Permissions Changes'];
findings.permissions.forEach(change => {
permSection.push(`\n**${change.file}**:`);
// Parse permissions into lines
const oldLines = (change.old === 'None' ? [] : change.old.split('\n').map(l => l.trim()).filter(Boolean));
const newLines = (change.new === 'None' ? [] : change.new.split('\n').map(l => l.trim()).filter(Boolean));
// Create sets for comparison
const oldSet = new Set(oldLines);
const newSet = new Set(newLines);
// Find added, removed, and unchanged
const removed = oldLines.filter(l => !newSet.has(l));
const added = newLines.filter(l => !oldSet.has(l));
const unchanged = oldLines.filter(l => newSet.has(l));
// Only show diff if there are actual changes
if (removed.length > 0 || added.length > 0) {
permSection.push('```diff');
// Show removed permissions
removed.forEach(line => permSection.push(`- ${line}`));
// Show added permissions
added.forEach(line => permSection.push(`+ ${line}`));
permSection.push('```');
// Summary for context
if (unchanged.length > 0 && unchanged.length <= 3) {
permSection.push(`<details><summary>Unchanged (${unchanged.length})</summary>\n\n${unchanged.map(l => `- ${l}`).join('\n')}\n</details>`);
} else if (unchanged.length > 3) {
permSection.push(`<sub>*${unchanged.length} permissions unchanged*</sub>`);
}
}
});
sections.push(permSection.join('\n'));
}
// New/Changed Actions
if (findings.actions.length > 0) {
const actionSection = ['## 🎯 New GitHub Actions'];
findings.actions.forEach(change => {
actionSection.push(`**${change.file}**:`);
change.added.forEach(action => {
actionSection.push(`- \`${action}\``);
});
});
sections.push(actionSection.join('\n'));
}
// Secrets Detected
if (findings.secrets.length > 0) {
const secretSection = ['## 🔑 Secrets Detected'];
findings.secrets.forEach(secret => {
const verified = secret.verified ? '🚨 **VERIFIED**' : '⚠️ Potential';
secretSection.push(`- ${verified} ${secret.detector} in \`${secret.file}:${secret.line}\``);
});
sections.push(secretSection.join('\n'));
}
// Security Vulnerabilities
if (findings.vulnerabilities.length > 0) {
const vulnSection = ['## ⚠️ Security Vulnerabilities'];
const groupedBySeverity = findings.vulnerabilities.reduce((acc, vuln) => {
const sev = vuln.severity.toUpperCase();
if (!acc[sev]) acc[sev] = [];
acc[sev].push(vuln);
return acc;
}, {});
['ERROR', 'WARNING', 'INFO'].forEach(severity => {
if (groupedBySeverity[severity]) {
vulnSection.push(`\n**${severity} Severity:**`);
groupedBySeverity[severity].forEach(vuln => {
vulnSection.push(`- \`${vuln.file}:${vuln.line}\` - ${vuln.message}`);
vulnSection.push(` - Rule: \`${vuln.rule}\``);
});
}
});
sections.push(vulnSection.join('\n'));
}
// Dependency Issues
if (findings.dependencies.length > 0) {
const depSection = ['## 📦 Dependency Vulnerabilities'];
const groupedBySeverity = findings.dependencies.reduce((acc, dep) => {
const sev = dep.severity.toUpperCase();
if (!acc[sev]) acc[sev] = [];
acc[sev].push(dep);
return acc;
}, {});
['CRITICAL', 'HIGH', 'MEDIUM', 'LOW'].forEach(severity => {
if (groupedBySeverity[severity]) {
depSection.push(`\n**${severity} Severity:**`);
groupedBySeverity[severity].forEach(dep => {
depSection.push(`- **${dep.cve}** in \`${dep.file}\``);
depSection.push(` - ${dep.description.substring(0, 100)}...`);
});
}
});
sections.push(depSection.join('\n'));
}
// Count critical issues for output
const criticalCount =
findings.secrets.filter(s => s.verified).length +
(findings.vulnerabilities.filter(v => v.severity.toUpperCase() === 'ERROR').length || 0) +
(findings.dependencies.filter(d => d.severity.toUpperCase() === 'CRITICAL').length || 0);
// Export critical count as output
core.setOutput('critical_issues', criticalCount.toString());
// Generate final comment with unique marker
let comment = `${SECURITY_COMMENT_MARKER}\n## ✅ Security Analysis\n\n`;
if (sections.length === 0) {
comment += 'No security issues detected in this PR.';
} else {
comment += sections.join('\n\n');
}
// Find existing security comment using unique marker
const { data: comments } = await github.rest.issues.listComments({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: context.issue.number
});
const existingComment = comments.find(comment =>
comment.body && comment.body.includes(SECURITY_COMMENT_MARKER)
);
if (existingComment) {
// Update existing comment
await github.rest.issues.updateComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
comment_id: existingComment.id,
body: comment
});
} else {
// Create new comment
await github.rest.issues.createComment({
owner: context.repo.owner,
repo: context.repo.repo,
issue_number: context.issue.number,
body: comment
});
}
- name: Check Critical Issues
if: always()
uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8
env:
CRITICAL_COUNT: ${{ steps.analyze.outputs.critical_issues || '0' }}
with:
script: |-
const criticalCount = parseInt(process.env.CRITICAL_COUNT || '0', 10);
if (criticalCount > 0) {
core.setFailed(`Found ${criticalCount} critical security issue(s). Please review and address them before merging.`);
} else {
console.log('No critical security issues found.');
}