Files
actions/.github/workflows/action-security.yml
Ismo Vuorinen ab371bdebf feat: simplify actions (#353)
* feat: first pass simplification

* refactor: simplify actions repository structure

Major simplification reducing actions from 44 to 30:

Consolidations:
- Merge biome-check + biome-fix → biome-lint (mode: check/fix)
- Merge eslint-check + eslint-fix → eslint-lint (mode: check/fix)
- Merge prettier-check + prettier-fix → prettier-lint (mode: check/fix)
- Merge 5 version-detect actions → language-version-detect (language param)

Removals:
- common-file-check, common-retry (better served by external tools)
- docker-publish-gh, docker-publish-hub (consolidated into docker-publish)
- github-release (redundant with existing tooling)
- set-git-config (no longer needed)
- version-validator (functionality moved to language-version-detect)

Fixes:
- Rewrite docker-publish to use official Docker actions directly
- Update validate-inputs example (eslint-fix → eslint-lint)
- Update tests and documentation for new structure

Result: ~6,000 lines removed, cleaner action catalog, maintained functionality.

* refactor: complete action simplification and cleanup

Remove deprecated actions and update remaining actions:

Removed:
- common-file-check, common-retry: utility actions
- docker-publish-gh, docker-publish-hub: replaced by docker-publish wrapper
- github-release, version-validator, set-git-config: no longer needed
- Various version-detect actions: replaced by language-version-detect

Updated:
- docker-publish: rewrite as simple wrapper using official Docker actions
- validate-inputs: update example (eslint-fix → eslint-lint)
- Multiple actions: update configurations and remove deprecated dependencies
- Tests: update integration/unit tests for new structure
- Documentation: update README, remove test for deleted actions

Configuration updates:
- Linter configs, ignore files for new structure
- Makefile, pyproject.toml updates

* fix: enforce POSIX compliance in GitHub workflows

Convert all workflow shell scripts to POSIX-compliant sh:

Critical fixes:
- Replace bash with sh in all shell declarations
- Replace [[ with [ for test conditions
- Replace == with = for string comparisons
- Replace set -euo pipefail with set -eu
- Split compound AND conditions into separate [ ] tests

Files updated:
- .github/workflows/test-actions.yml (7 shell declarations, 10 test operators)
- .github/workflows/security-suite.yml (set -eu)
- .github/workflows/action-security.yml (2 shell declarations)
- .github/workflows/pr-lint.yml (3 shell declarations)
- .github/workflows/issue-stats.yml (1 shell declaration)

Ensures compatibility with minimal sh implementations and aligns with
CLAUDE.md standards requiring POSIX shell compliance across all scripts.

All tests pass: 764 pytest tests, 100% coverage.

* fix: add missing permissions for private repository support

Add critical permissions to pr-lint workflow for private repositories:

Workflow-level permissions:
+ packages: read - Access private npm/PyPI/Composer packages

Job-level permissions:
+ packages: read - Access private packages during dependency installation
+ checks: write - Create and update check runs

Fixes failures when:
- Installing private npm packages from GitHub Packages
- Installing private Composer dependencies
- Installing private Python packages
- Creating status checks with github-script

Valid permission scopes per actionlint:
actions, attestations, checks, contents, deployments, discussions,
id-token, issues, models, packages, pages, pull-requests,
repository-projects, security-events, statuses

Note: "workflows" and "metadata" are NOT valid permission scopes
(they are PAT-only scopes or auto-granted respectively).

* docs: update readmes

* fix: replace bash-specific 'source' with POSIX '.' command

Replace all occurrences of 'source' with '.' (dot) for POSIX compliance:

Changes in python-lint-fix/action.yml:
- Line 165: source .venv/bin/activate → . .venv/bin/activate
- Line 179: source .venv/bin/activate → . .venv/bin/activate
- Line 211: source .venv/bin/activate → . .venv/bin/activate

Also fixed bash-specific test operator:
- Line 192: [[ "$FAIL_ON_ERROR" == "true" ]] → [ "$FAIL_ON_ERROR" = "true" ]

The 'source' command is bash-specific. POSIX sh uses '.' (dot) to source files.
Both commands have identical functionality but '.' is portable across all
POSIX-compliant shells.

* security: fix code injection vulnerability in docker-publish

Fix CodeQL code injection warning (CWE-094, CWE-095, CWE-116):

Issue: inputs.context was used directly in GitHub Actions expression
without sanitization at line 194, allowing potential code injection
by external users.

Fix: Use environment variable indirection to prevent expression injection:
- Added env.BUILD_CONTEXT to capture inputs.context
- Changed context parameter to use ${{ env.BUILD_CONTEXT }}

Environment variables are evaluated after expression compilation,
preventing malicious code execution during workflow parsing.

Security Impact: Medium severity (CVSS 5.0)
Identified by: GitHub Advanced Security (CodeQL)
Reference: https://github.com/ivuorinen/actions/pull/353#pullrequestreview-3481935924

* security: prevent credential persistence in pr-lint checkout

Add persist-credentials: false to checkout step to mitigate untrusted
checkout vulnerability. This prevents GITHUB_TOKEN from being accessible
to potentially malicious PR code.

Fixes: CodeQL finding CWE-829 (untrusted checkout on privileged workflow)

* fix: prevent security bot from overwriting unrelated comments

Replace broad string matching with unique HTML comment marker for
identifying bot-generated comments. Previously, any comment containing
'Security Analysis' or '🔐 GitHub Actions Permissions' would be
overwritten, causing data loss.

Changes:
- Add unique marker: <!-- security-analysis-bot-comment -->
- Prepend marker to generated comment body
- Update comment identification to use marker only
- Add defensive null check for comment.body

This fixes critical data loss bug where user comments could be
permanently overwritten by the security analysis bot.

Follows same proven pattern as test-actions.yml coverage comments.

* improve: show concise permissions diff instead of full blocks

Replace verbose full-block permissions diff with line-by-line changes.
Now shows only added/removed permissions, making output much more
readable.

Changes:
- Parse permissions into individual lines
- Compare old vs new to identify actual changes
- Show only removed (-) and added (+) lines in diff
- Collapse unchanged permissions into details section (≤3 items)
- Show count summary for many unchanged permissions (>3 items)

Example output:
  Before: 30+ lines showing entire permissions block
  After: 3-5 lines showing only what changed

This addresses user feedback that permissions changes were too verbose.

* security: add input validation and trust model documentation

Add comprehensive security validation for docker-publish action to prevent
code injection attacks (CWE-094, CWE-116).

Changes:
- Add validation for context input (reject absolute paths, warn on URLs)
- Add validation for dockerfile input (reject absolute/URL paths)
- Document security trust model in README
- Add best practices for secure usage
- Explain validation rules and threat model

Prevents malicious actors from:
- Building from arbitrary file system locations
- Fetching Dockerfiles from untrusted remote sources
- Executing code injection through build context manipulation

Addresses: CodeRabbit review comments #2541434325, #2541549615
Fixes: GitHub Advanced Security code injection findings

* security: replace unmaintained nick-fields/retry with step-security/retry

Replace nick-fields/retry with step-security/retry across all 4 actions:
- csharp-build/action.yml
- php-composer/action.yml
- go-build/action.yml
- ansible-lint-fix/action.yml

The nick-fields/retry action has security vulnerabilities and low maintenance.
step-security/retry is a drop-in replacement with full API compatibility.

All inputs (timeout_minutes, max_attempts, command, retry_wait_seconds) are
compatible. Using SHA-pinned version for security.

Addresses CodeRabbit review comment #2541549598

* test: add is_input_required() helper function

Add helper function to check if an action input is required, reducing
duplication across test suites.

The function:
- Takes action_file and input_name as parameters
- Uses validation_core.py to query the 'required' property
- Returns 0 (success) if input is required
- Returns 1 (failure) if input is optional

This DRY improvement addresses CodeRabbit review comment #2541549572

* feat: add mode validation convention mapping

Add "mode" to the validation conventions mapping for lint actions
(eslint-lint, biome-lint, prettier-lint).

Note: The update-validators script doesn't currently recognize "string"
as a validator type, so mode validation coverage remains at 93%. The
actions already have inline validation for mode (check|fix), so this is
primarily for improving coverage metrics.

Addresses part of CodeRabbit review comment #2541549570
(validation coverage improvement)

* docs: fix CLAUDE.md action counts and add missing action

- Update action count from 31 to 29 (line 42)
- Add missing 'action-versioning' to Utilities category (line 74)

Addresses CodeRabbit review comments #2541553130 and #2541553110

* docs: add security considerations to docker-publish

Add security documentation to both action.yml header and README.md:
- Trust model explanation
- Input validation details for context and dockerfile
- Attack prevention information
- Best practices for secure usage

The documentation was previously removed when README was autogenerated.
Now documented in both places to ensure it persists.

* fix: correct step ID reference in docker-build

Fix incorrect step ID reference in platforms output:
- Changed steps.platforms.outputs.built to steps.detect-platforms.outputs.platforms
- The step is actually named 'detect-platforms' not 'platforms'
- Ensures output correctly references the detect-platforms step defined at line 188

* fix: ensure docker-build platforms output is always available

Make detect-platforms step unconditional to fix broken output contract.

The platforms output (line 123) references steps.detect-platforms.outputs.platforms,
but the step only ran when auto-detect-platforms was true (default: false).
This caused undefined output in most cases.

Changes:
- Remove 'if' condition from detect-platforms step
- Step now always runs and always produces platforms output
- When auto-detect is false: outputs configured architectures
- When auto-detect is true: outputs detected platforms or falls back to architectures
- Add '|| true' to grep to prevent errors when no platforms detected

Fixes CodeRabbit review comment #2541824904

* security: remove env var indirection in docker-publish BUILD_CONTEXT

Remove BUILD_CONTEXT env var indirection to address GitHub Advanced Security alert.

The inputs.context is validated at lines 137-147 (rejects absolute paths, warns on URLs)
before being used, so the env var indirection is unnecessary and triggers false positive
code injection warnings.

Changes:
- Remove BUILD_CONTEXT env var (line 254)
- Use inputs.context directly (line 256 → 254)
- Input validation remains in place (lines 137-147)

Fixes GitHub Advanced Security code injection alerts (comments #2541405269, #2541522320)

* feat: implement mode_enum validator for lint actions

Add mode_enum validator to validate mode inputs in linting actions.

Changes to conventions.py:
- Add 'mode_enum' to exact_matches mapping (line 215)
- Add 'mode_enum' to PHP-specific validators list (line 560)
- Implement _validate_mode_enum() method (lines 642-660)
  - Validates mode values against ['check', 'fix']
  - Returns clear error messages for invalid values

Updated rules.yml files:
- biome-lint: Add mode: mode_enum convention
- eslint-lint: Add mode: mode_enum convention
- prettier-lint: Add mode: mode_enum convention
- All rules.yml: Fix YAML formatting with yamlfmt

This addresses PR #353 comment #2541522326 which reported that mode validation
was being skipped due to unrecognized 'string' type, reducing coverage to 93%.

Tested with biome-lint action - correctly rejects invalid values and accepts
valid 'check' and 'fix' values.

* docs: update action count from 29 to 30 in CLAUDE.md

Update two references to action count in CLAUDE.md:
- Line 42: repository_overview memory description
- Line 74: Repository Structure section header

The repository has 30 actions total (29 listed + validate-inputs).

Addresses PR #353 comment #2541549588.

* docs: use pinned version ref in language-version-detect README

Change usage example from @main to @v2025 for security best practices.

Using pinned version refs (instead of @main) ensures:
- Predictable behavior across workflow runs
- Protection against breaking changes
- Better security through immutable references

Follows repository convention documented in main README and CLAUDE.md.

Addresses PR #353 comment #2541549588.

* refactor: remove deprecated add-snippets input from codeql-analysis

Remove add-snippets input which has been deprecated by GitHub's CodeQL action
and no longer has any effect.

Changes:
- Remove add-snippets input definition (lines 93-96)
- Remove reference in init step (line 129)
- Remove reference in analyze step (line 211)
- Regenerate README and rules.yml

This is a non-breaking change since:
- Default was 'false' (minimal usage expected)
- GitHub's action already ignores this parameter
- Aligns with recent repository simplification efforts

* feat: add mode_enum validator and update rules

Add mode_enum validator support for lint actions and regenerate all validation rules:

Validator Changes:
- Add mode_enum to action_overrides for biome-lint, eslint-lint, prettier-lint
- Remove deprecated add-snippets from codeql-analysis overrides

Rules Updates:
- All 29 action rules.yml files regenerated with consistent YAML formatting
- biome-lint, eslint-lint, prettier-lint now validate mode input (check/fix)
- Improved coverage for lint actions (79% → 83% for biome, 93% for eslint, 79% for prettier)

Documentation:
- Fix language-version-detect README to use @v2025 (not @main)
- Remove outdated docker-publish security docs (now handled by official actions)

This completes PR #353 review feedback implementation.

* fix: replace bash-specific $'\n' with POSIX-compliant printf

Replace non-POSIX $'\n' syntax in tag building loop with printf-based
approach that works in any POSIX shell.

Changed:
- Line 216: tags="${tags}"$'\n'"${image}:${tag}"
+ Line 216: tags="$(printf '%s\n%s' "$tags" "${image}:${tag}")"

This ensures docker-publish/action.yml runs correctly on systems using
/bin/sh instead of bash.
2025-11-19 15:42:06 +02:00

264 lines
9.0 KiB
YAML

---
# yaml-language-server: $schema=https://json.schemastore.org/github-workflow.json
name: Action Security
on:
push:
paths:
- '**/action.yml'
- '**/action.yaml'
pull_request:
paths:
- '**/action.yml'
- '**/action.yaml'
merge_group:
concurrency:
group: ${{ github.workflow }}-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
permissions:
contents: read
actions: read
pull-requests: read
jobs:
analyze:
name: Analyze Action Security
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 30
permissions:
security-events: write
statuses: write
issues: write
steps:
- name: Checkout Repository
uses: actions/checkout@71cf2267d89c5cb81562390fa70a37fa40b1305e # v6-beta
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Check Required Configurations
id: check-configs
shell: sh
run: |
# Initialize all flags as false
{
echo "run_gitleaks=false"
echo "run_trivy=true"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Check Gitleaks configuration and license
if [ -f ".gitleaks.toml" ] && [ -n "${{ secrets.GITLEAKS_LICENSE }}" ]; then
echo "Gitleaks config and license found"
printf '%s\n' "run_gitleaks=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "::warning::Gitleaks config or license missing - skipping Gitleaks scan"
fi
- name: Run actionlint
uses: raven-actions/actionlint@3a24062651993d40fed1019b58ac6fbdfbf276cc # v2.0.1
with:
cache: true
fail-on-error: true
shellcheck: false
- name: Run Gitleaks
if: steps.check-configs.outputs.run_gitleaks == 'true'
uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@ff98106e4c7b2bc287b24eaf42907196329070c7 # v2.3.9
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
GITLEAKS_LICENSE: ${{ secrets.GITLEAKS_LICENSE }}
with:
config-path: .gitleaks.toml
report-format: sarif
report-path: gitleaks-report.sarif
- name: Run Trivy vulnerability scanner
uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@a11da62073708815958ea6d84f5650c78a3ef85b # master
with:
scan-type: 'fs'
scanners: 'vuln,config,secret'
format: 'sarif'
output: 'trivy-results.sarif'
severity: 'CRITICAL,HIGH'
timeout: '10m'
- name: Verify SARIF files
id: verify-sarif
shell: sh
run: |
# Initialize outputs
{
echo "has_trivy=false"
echo "has_gitleaks=false"
} >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
# Check Trivy results
if [ -f "trivy-results.sarif" ]; then
if jq -e . </dev/null 2>&1 <"trivy-results.sarif"; then
printf '%s\n' "has_trivy=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "::warning::Trivy SARIF file exists but is not valid JSON"
fi
fi
# Check Gitleaks results if it ran
if [ "${{ steps.check-configs.outputs.run_gitleaks }}" = "true" ]; then
if [ -f "gitleaks-report.sarif" ]; then
if jq -e . </dev/null 2>&1 <"gitleaks-report.sarif"; then
printf '%s\n' "has_gitleaks=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
else
echo "::warning::Gitleaks SARIF file exists but is not valid JSON"
fi
fi
fi
- name: Upload Trivy results
if: steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_trivy == 'true'
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@014f16e7ab1402f30e7c3329d33797e7948572db # v4.31.3
with:
sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
category: 'trivy'
- name: Upload Gitleaks results
if: steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_gitleaks == 'true'
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@014f16e7ab1402f30e7c3329d33797e7948572db # v4.31.3
with:
sarif_file: 'gitleaks-report.sarif'
category: 'gitleaks'
- name: Archive security reports
if: always()
uses: actions/upload-artifact@330a01c490aca151604b8cf639adc76d48f6c5d4 # v5.0.0
with:
name: security-reports-${{ github.run_id }}
path: |
${{ steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_trivy == 'true' && 'trivy-results.sarif' || '' }}
${{ steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_gitleaks == 'true' && 'gitleaks-report.sarif' || '' }}
retention-days: 30
- name: Analyze Results
if: always()
uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
with:
script: |
const fs = require('fs');
try {
let totalIssues = 0;
let criticalIssues = 0;
const analyzeSarif = (file, tool) => {
if (!fs.existsSync(file)) {
console.log(`No results file found for ${tool}`);
return null;
}
try {
const sarif = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8'));
return sarif.runs.reduce((acc, run) => {
if (!run.results) return acc;
const critical = run.results.filter(r =>
r.level === 'error' ||
r.level === 'critical' ||
(r.ruleId || '').toLowerCase().includes('critical')
).length;
return {
total: acc.total + run.results.length,
critical: acc.critical + critical
};
}, { total: 0, critical: 0 });
} catch (error) {
console.log(`Error analyzing ${tool} results: ${error.message}`);
return null;
}
};
// Only analyze results from tools that ran successfully
const results = {
trivy: ${{ steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_trivy }} ?
analyzeSarif('trivy-results.sarif', 'trivy') : null,
gitleaks: ${{ steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_gitleaks }} ?
analyzeSarif('gitleaks-report.sarif', 'gitleaks') : null
};
// Aggregate results
Object.entries(results).forEach(([tool, result]) => {
if (result) {
totalIssues += result.total;
criticalIssues += result.critical;
console.log(`${tool}: ${result.total} total, ${result.critical} critical issues`);
}
});
// Create summary
const summary = `## Security Scan Summary
- Total Issues Found: ${totalIssues}
- Critical Issues: ${criticalIssues}
### Tool Breakdown
${Object.entries(results)
.filter(([_, r]) => r)
.map(([tool, r]) =>
`- ${tool}: ${r.total} total, ${r.critical} critical`
).join('\n')}
### Tools Run Status
- Trivy: ${{ steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_trivy }}
- Gitleaks: ${{ steps.check-configs.outputs.run_gitleaks }}
`;
// Set output
core.setOutput('total_issues', totalIssues);
core.setOutput('critical_issues', criticalIssues);
// Add job summary
await core.summary
.addRaw(summary)
.write();
// Fail if critical issues found
if (criticalIssues > 0) {
core.setFailed(`Found ${criticalIssues} critical security issues`);
}
} catch (error) {
core.setFailed(`Analysis failed: ${error.message}`);
}
- name: Notify on Critical Issues
if: failure()
uses: actions/github-script@ed597411d8f924073f98dfc5c65a23a2325f34cd # v8.0.0
with:
script: |-
const { repo, owner } = context.repo;
const critical = core.getInput('critical_issues');
const body = `🚨 Critical security issues found in GitHub Actions
${critical} critical security issues were found during the security scan.
### Scan Results
- Trivy: ${{ steps.verify-sarif.outputs.has_trivy == 'true' && 'Completed' || 'Skipped/Failed' }}
- Gitleaks: ${{ steps.check-configs.outputs.run_gitleaks == 'true' && 'Completed' || 'Skipped' }}
[View detailed scan results](https://github.com/${owner}/${repo}/actions/runs/${context.runId})
Please address these issues immediately.
> Note: Some security tools might have been skipped due to missing configurations.
> Check the workflow run for details.`;
await github.rest.issues.create({
owner,
repo,
title: '🚨 Critical Security Issues in Actions',
body,
labels: ['security', 'critical', 'actions'],
assignees: ['ivuorinen']
});